National Control Lists in Central Asian Countries

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1. INTRODUCTION

The Central Asian region is attractive for the analysis of proliferation risks from several points of view, as it is a region whose countries have the rich nuclear heritage of the Soviet Union and an area with a “beneficial” geographic location. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Central Asian states were left with its military-industrial complex, including nuclear reactors, and its elements and items. These unexpected challenges required independent governments to come up with quick and clear-cut solutions for controlling items and technologies. At that time, states incorporated the basic

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2 For more details on former Soviet Union countries in the Central Asia region in terms of export control and non-proliferation after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, see:
principles of the export control system. These days, the significance of the system for Central Asian countries is still high because they are exporting and importing strategic commodities\(^3\).

Furthermore, from a geographic standpoint, Central Asia is a sort of connecting link between potential proliferation regions (the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, South Asia, China)\(^4\) and supplier countries in terms of both legal transfers and transfers of illegal goods. From both viewpoints, Central Asia is a region where there is a possible proliferation threat. In addition, some border conflicts can elevate the risks. That is why strategic trade control, its adoption and its effective implementation are vital in Central Asia. In turn, if countries intend to have sufficient strategic trade control, they should strengthen the national control list to meet the challenges of global technology changes and to comply with international requirements.

The initial purpose of this paper is to explore the national control lists of Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) as one of the core elements of strategic trade control. The focus is on the legislative framework of the implementation of control lists and the reference model of the national control lists. The national lists will be looked at more closely by taking a rapid glance at the development level of the export control system as a whole in these countries.

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\(^3\) For countries’ exports and imports of strategic goods as represented in the Strategic Trade Atlas, see:

2. STRATEGIC TRADE CONTROL: DETERMINANTS, EFFICIENCY, AND ELEMENTS

Strategic trade control\(^5\) has different determinants, and each of them is crucial. The most important determinants are non-proliferation and security. This includes compliance with international obligations, the prohibition of the transit of dangerous materials, and others. In this context, the question of the importance of STC is axiomatic.

Nevertheless, it is not limited to two determinants. There are other significant determinants, such as the increase of controlled flows of technology transfer, the growing military significance of commercial technologies, the risks of political isolation and economic retaliation (hegemonic stability theory)\(^6\), the prevention of

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5 What is the term “export control” or “strategic trade control”? This question is still open for discussion, and there is currently no consensus among experts. Usually, the two terms are used together and interchangeably, but for the more precise attitude towards the terminology in the expert community, see Dill, Catherine B., and Ian J. Stewart. 2015. “Defining Effective Strategic Trade Controls at the National Level. The Strategic Trade Review 1(1): 4–17, available from http://www.strulg.ac.be/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/STR_01.pdf (Accessed on 29/11/2019). The main difference is the scope of the “activities, items, and actors concerned” in the case of strategic goods. For instance, the Strategic Trade Control Enforcement Implementation Guide notes that “the term “Strategic Trade Control” is used rather than “Export Control” to recognise the importance of controlling strategic goods in various international transactions, including import, export, transit, trans-shipment, other,” available from http://www.wcoomd.org/-/media/wco/public/global/pdf/topics/enforcement-and-compliance/tools-and-instruments/stce-implementation-guide/stce-implementation-guide_en.pdf?db=web, p. 8. (Accessed on 29/11/2019). Thus, the analysis of the experience of different countries and international legislation has shown that there is no standard or universally recognised approach to the term “export control.” This paper uses “strategic trade control” and its acronym, STC, rather than “export control”. However, in references, the original term of the authors is used.

6 “...Hegemonic stability theory portrays international regimes as the result of an exceedingly powerful state finding it in its interest to coerce others into the coordinated provision of an international public good, such as export control”, see Lipson, Michael. 1999. “The Reincarnation of COCOM: Explaining Post-Cold War Export Controls”. Nonproliferation Review 6(2): 33–51.
shortages of supply, economic success, and so forth. Furthermore, STC should be able to respond to contemporary challenges, such as changing technologies and the intangible nature of certain goods. As such, the rationale of the STC system is essential on both the national (regional) and the global level for supplier-countries of strategic goods, and for transit and importing countries.

From the perspective of the efficacy of STC, there is still not a precise and conventional definition and set of measures whose implementation would enable states to achieve an effective STC system. The principal purpose of STC is to control the transfer of sensitive items and technologies that might be used to create a weapon of mass destruction (WMD). The effectiveness of the export control system is defined in a context where other countries are prevented from buying materials and components for WMD. However, it is difficult to measure how much this occurs. In this context, the effectiveness of the export control system can be measur-

See:
ured by the effectiveness of each element of the system. Moreover, any missing elements can be considered as a source of the issues and weakness of the global network.\(^8\)

Despite the compulsory requirements of international regimes and agreements on the adoption and implementation of STC, there are no widely agreed upon or standard elements for realising effective STCs.\(^9\) The variety of approaches to the standard elements of export control/STC is proven by the literature review. It is beyond argument that despite different views on the elements that make up STC, there is evidence of the similarity of approaches and the importance of the elements for issues of global, regional, and national safety, stability and peace around the world, non-proliferation, and compliance with international agreements. Moreover, the control list is one of the core components of the system.

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8 See:
- Dill and Stewart (2015).

9 Dill and Stewart (2015).
3. STRATEGIC TRADE CONTROLS IN CENTRAL ASIAN COUNTRIES

An overall picture of the Central Asian countries’ STCs and their development can be drawn based on the results of papers that have applied the well-known and frequently used method of assessment of export control systems (the so-called Index method\textsuperscript{10}) and the outcomes of the published Peddling Peril Index (PPI)\textsuperscript{11} report.

Several papers have used the Index method to analyse Central Asian countries\textsuperscript{12}, together with other world countries. The last publicly accessible evaluation of export control in Central Asian countries was conducted 18 years ago. This means that the current situation may be different, and only new, updated assessments under


\textsuperscript{11} The first report was published in 2017 by the Institute for Science and International Security Press, with a second, updated edition in 2019. See Albright, David, Sarah Burkhard, and Andrea Stricker. 2019. The Peddling Peril Index (PPI): Ranking National Strategic Trade Control Systems. The PPI aims to measure the efficacy of STCs in states applying a set of criteria by examining legal acts, the institutional framework and their implementation in practice. It permits the identification of national STCs’ strengths and weaknesses.

\textsuperscript{12} See:
- Bertsch and Grillot (1998);
- Cupitt, Grillot, and Murayama (2001);
- Beck et al. (2003).
the method can provide information for further interpretation. Coincidentally, this does not mean that there is no recent analysis of STCs, including an assessment of the control list\(^{13}\). The subtask of this section is to look back, understand the starting positions and find out the current status of the systems.

The completed studies of the first ten years since the countries’ independence show that five countries of Central Asia adopted at least some elements of the export control system. The analysis by the Index method includes ten elements of the system: licensing system; regime adherence; training; customs authority; penalties; control lists; catch-all clause; bureaucratic process; import/export verification; and information gathering/sharing. Additionally, the evaluation also considers subparts:\(^{14}\) policy and/or legal foundation, institutions, procedures, and implementation\(^{15}\). The overall weighted scores of the countries are presented in Table 1.

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\(^{13}\) There are more recent evaluations of Central Asian countries in the form of assessments carried out by a donor country regarding a recipient country (between countries helping to improve export control systems and countries accepting their support in the adoption and evolution of the systems), but these are not in the public domain.

\(^{14}\) (1) policies and/or legal framework – the existence of laws and decrees on export control that ensure the legislative framework for controlling strategic goods; (2) institutions and procedures – does a country have responsible institutions and procedures for the development and implementation of its STC legislation? (3) implementation – are export control policies and procedures actually in use?

\(^{15}\) Bertsch and Grillot (1998).
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>12.35</td>
<td>16.13</td>
<td>28.29</td>
<td>64% (26.76)</td>
<td>68% (28.43)</td>
<td>59.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15.30</td>
<td>(1) 31%</td>
<td>(2) 29%</td>
<td>30.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.36</td>
<td>10% (4.18)</td>
<td>(1) 21%</td>
<td>7.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.36</td>
<td>10% (4.18)</td>
<td>(1) 21%</td>
<td>10.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7.14</td>
<td>17% (7.11)</td>
<td>(1) 25%</td>
<td>33.28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Perfect weighted score**

- Max=41.82
- Max=100

Questionnaire

- 72 items
- 93 items

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* The scores reported for Kazakhstan (Lipson, Michael. 2004. "Nonproliferation Export Control and World Order: Globalization, Security, and the State") is the ideal score of 100.

** (1) is Policy; (2) is Institutions; (3) is Implementation.

1 The five figures in the column show the percentage compliance. The perfect weighted score is 41.82, which represents 100 per cent compliance with Western common standards. See Bertsch and Grillot (1998), p. 13, p. 29.


4 Craft, Grillot, and Anderson (2000).

5 Cupitt, Grillot, and Murayama (2001).
To obtain a general picture of export controls in the countries from Table 1, the scores in columns (6), (8) and (10) have been brought into compliance with a maximum score of 41.82 (in parentheses). It is crucial to emphasise that the rounding of the score is very rough, especially in data from 1992-1997 and 2000-2001, because authors applied 72-item and 93-item questionnaires to assess the export control. As such, the comparison is not precise.

In line with the data, the most developed export control system was in Kazakhstan and had strengthened in the period 1992-2001, before remaining more or less stable over the last five years. The highest score can be explained by the aid that Kazakhstan has received to develop its export control system\textsuperscript{16}. Uzbekistan improved its scores twofold, Turkmenistan maintained its standardised scores across the period, and Kyrgyzstan’s scores decreased slightly. The lowest score was noted in Tajikistan.

The subparts’ scores in columns (5), (7) and (9) explicitly demonstrate the gap between export control policy and its implementation. The difference shows that policy adoption alone is not enough for the system to be effective; it is the most natural part of the process. It is more valuable to build up the institutional framework of institutions and procedures and to implement appropriately. All Central Asian countries demonstrate a considerable difference between the enactment of the law on export control and its implementation.

The elements of the export control system have been evaluated by state in two papers\textsuperscript{17}. Table 2 represents the scores given to the element “Control list” in Central Asian countries. In order to more correctly interpret the development status of national control lists at that time, scores are given for other elements, such as “Licensing”,

\textsuperscript{16} Kazakhstan received aid from the United States for the adoption of the export control system and expertise, for instance in the framework of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.

\textsuperscript{17} Bertsch and Grillot (1998) and Craft, Grillot, and Anderson (2000).
“Catch-all”, “Customs”, “Verification” and “Penalties”. The scores in 1997 and 2000 are slightly different, the most significant difference being the “Penalties” score given to Uzbekistan. As such, the elements of the export controls in Central Asia differed between countries: Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan had the foundation of the system, as they had developed “Licensing systems” and a “Control list”. Meanwhile, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan lacked a “Control list”. The development of the “Licensing system” can be explained by the intention of the countries to control not only strategic goods, but also the foreign trade of goods (short-supply and smuggling goods). Enforcement procedures were supported mostly by the activity of the customs authorities. The percentages of the element “Customs” were equal to or higher than 50% in all countries. The “Catch-all” element was not developed at all; the “Verification” element aimed to verify the issued licences and was most developed in Kazakhstan, while the other four countries showed zero development.

Consequently, the evaluation of these elements indicated the lack of most of the necessary elements for the export control system (“Control list”, “Catch-all”, “Verification”). Other more or less developed elements indicated countries’ interest in controlling foreign trade in general without focusing strongly on dual-use and related items. In general terms, it depicts the starting point and the development level of export controls and control lists almost ten years after obtaining independence.

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18 The key pillars of the export control system, in general terms, are the Licensing system, Control lists, Enforcement and Compliance mechanisms and Industry Outreach. The study of control lists does not consider Industry Outreach.

19 As mentioned above, the main reason for this is the different number of items in questionnaires and the tools used in the weighting.

Table 2: SCORES OF SOME ELEMENTS IN THE FRAMEWORK OF ASSESSMENT OF EXPORT CONTROLS IN CENTRAL ASIAN COUNTRIES, PERCENTAGE OF PERFECT WEIGHTED SCORE, 1997 AND 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Element</th>
<th>Licensing</th>
<th>List Regimes</th>
<th>Catch-all</th>
<th>Customs</th>
<th>Verification</th>
<th>Penalties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The perfect weighted score is 41.82 (Bertsch and Grillot (1998)).
**The perfect weighted score is 100 (Craft, Grillot, and Anderson (2000)). The paper did not consider Kazakhstan in the analysis.
Furthermore, the situation of the Central Asian control systems in 2019 (PPI ranks and scores) has changed compared with the positions in 1992-2001\textsuperscript{21}. Two countries, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan\textsuperscript{22}, have the highest ratings and have places in the “Green group”. This means that both countries have comprehensive legislation covering the control of conventional weapons and nuclear single- and dual-use items\textsuperscript{23}, and have catch-all clauses and transit and transshipment controls. The “Green group” countries have chosen the EU dual-use control list and the list of the Wassenaar Arrangement as the reference model for their national control lists. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are in the “Light Green group”, which means that they have at least adopted List 1 of NPG and control of convention weapons. Tajikistan has improved its system in terms of its position relative to Turkmenistan: in 1997 the two countries had almost the same score; in 2000-2001 there was a slight difference; and in 2019 their scores differ markedly. Tajikistan has been on the rise since 2001: at that time, it had the lowest rating among the five countries, while in the 2019 rankings it has overtaken Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Turkmenistan\textsuperscript{24} had low scores in the past and still has the lowest position in the group of Central Asian countries in 2019, demonstrating the severe shortfalls in its control of dual-use and single-use items.

\textsuperscript{21} The comparison of the ranks/scores of STCs and their elements/overarching criteria in 1997-2001 and 2019 is not accurate because the approach and the methodology are different, but some development milestones in can be observed.
\textsuperscript{22} It is important to emphasise that Kyrgyzstan overtook Kazakhstan in two overarching criteria, namely “Legislation” and “Ability to Prevent Proliferation Financing”, in 2019.
\textsuperscript{23} At least the NSG Parts 1 and 2 lists or similar lists. The NSG Parts 1 and 2 lists are available on https://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/en/news/185-nsg-control-lists-updated. (Accessed on 29/11/2019).
\textsuperscript{24} Turkmenistan is in the “Orange group”, which means that its legislation is insufficient and only controls of conventional weapons under ATT.
4. **NATIONAL CONTROL LISTS OF CENTRAL ASIAN COUNTRIES**

This section seeks to describe and examine the national control lists of Central Asian countries under the lens of a reference model for the establishment and implementation of national control lists and their legislative framework.

In Kazakhstan, the very first control list was established in Annexes 1 and 2 of the Regulation\(^\text{25}\). This list applied the terms and definitions of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Subsequently, the Decree of the Government (March 12, 1996, N 298)\(^\text{26}\) created the control lists for the country\(^\text{27}\). At that time, the national control list did not coincide with international lists\(^\text{28}\), and included several lists:

- the list of goods exported by permission of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Appendix 2);
- the list of goods imported with the authorisation of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Appendix 3);
- the list of products exported under licences (Appendix 4);
- the list of products whose import is carried out under licences (Appendix 5);
- the list of goods exported in accordance with the international obligations of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Appendix 6).

Furthermore, the catch-all clause did not exist in the legislation. The situation then changed in 2000, when the new list of products subject to export control was introduced by the Decree of

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The Government (August 18, 2000, N 1282). This list was based on the EU dual-use control list and the Common Military list, but it was not well structured. The amendments to the legislation on export control added the catch-all clause and import/reimport operations. In 2007, the new Law on Export control was established (June 21, 2007, N 300), and then in 2008 the updated control list was published (February 5, 2008, N 104). This control list is structured well, and this structure is still in force. The national control list consists of 0-9 categories like in the EU list, plus a tenth category for items which were not covered by previous categories, and the list of the military goods (ML1-ML 22). Each category contains five technical groups of dual-use items.

The updating process of the national control list is not automatically related to the updates of the EU list, but instead is maintained permanently. Since 2008, the control list has been updated eight times. The latest amendments were on May 14, 2018. In terms of ease of public access, the national control list is available from any legislative database with detailed information on all amendments. The information is available in the official languages of Kazakhstan.

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32 The Law the Republic of Kazakhstan on Export control, November 24, 2000, N 105.

33 The Law the Republic of Kazakhstan on Export control, June 21, 2007, N 300.


35 A – equipment, components and components; B – production and testing equipment; C – materials; D – software; E – technology. The technical group refers to multilateral and unilateral export control regimes: 000-099 – WA; 100-199 – MTCR; 200-299 – NSG; 300-399 – AG; 400-499 – CWC; 500-899 – reserve; 900-999 – One-way product listings controlled within the framework of national security.
In Kyrgyzstan, the legal basis for non-proliferation export control and the national control list is provided by two Decrees of the Government (March 19, 1993, N 121 and February 6, 1996, N 56). The Decree of 1993 included the list of raw materials, materials, equipment, technologies and services that are used to create WMD and missile delivery vehicles (as well as those with a dual purpose). The list was concise and did not have any classifications, apart from the classification of bacteria and toxins. The next Decree in 1996 had amendments and contained the Regulation on the procedure for the export and import of goods (works and services) (Appendix 1). It also comprised four different lists:

- the list of goods exported by permission of the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic (Appendix 2);
- the list of strategically important goods, whose export contracts are registered (for accounting) (Appendix 3);
- the lists of goods (works and services) whose import is carried out by permission of the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic (Appendix 4);
- the lists of goods exported under international obligations (Appendix 5).

The lists were structured to show the name of the good and its Foreign Economic Activity Commodity Nomenclature, FEACN. Despite these efforts, the composition of the control list failed. In 2003, the country embarked on a new stage of the improvement

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36 The Decree of the Government of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan “On issues of export control of raw materials, equipment, technology and services, custom to create weapons of mass destruction and missile delivery vehicles” (March 19, 1993, N 121) and the Decree of the Government of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan “About the procedure for export and import of goods (works and services) in the territory of the Kyrgyz Republic” (February 6, 1996, N 56).

37 Craft, Grillot, and Anderson (2000).
of its export control system and four\(^\text{38}\) legal acts were established, including a national control list. Furthermore, the catch-all mechanism was included in the extended explanation.

The national control list is similar to the EU dual-use control list in terms of content, but has a different approach to applying codes and structure. Its structure includes information about custom codes (FEACN of the Eurasian Economic Union\(^\text{39}\)), notes and terms with explanations in every list. The list has six detailed lists:

- the list of pathogens of human, animal and plant diseases, pathogens, genetically modified microorganisms, toxins, equipment and technologies;
- the list of chemicals, equipment and technologies that can be used to create chemical weapons;
- the list of nuclear materials, equipment, unique non-nuclear materials and related technologies;
- the list of dual-use equipment and associated materials and technologies used for nuclear purposes;
- the list of equipment, materials and technologies that can be used to create missile weapons;
- the list of dual-use goods and technologies subject to export control that can be used to develop weapons and military equipment.

The latest amendment of the national control list took place in September 2017. The list is not updated automatically; it is usually updated according to changes in the control lists of international export control regimes. The legislation on export control must


\(^{39}\) It is also essential to remember the Eurasian Economic Union (Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan), which supposes the unity of participation of the member states in international agreements and control regimes, the unification of countries’ legislation, and the creation a single legal framework as well as the unified control list.
be updated at least once within two years since its last update. The national list is publicly available in two languages without any obstacles: Kyrgyz and Russian.

Tajikistan has made several attempts to establish an export control system, and tried to adopt decrees on the critical goods (aluminium and cotton). Furthermore, it initiated a draft law on procedures for controlling chemical substances and technologies, but by the end of 1997 the law had not been enacted\(^\text{40}\). In 1997, the Law on State control (December 13, 1997, N 521) was implemented,\(^\text{41}\) which means that in this period the state had a control list. The list of goods (works, services) whose export, import and transit is carried out by the decision of the Government\(^\text{42}\) probably contained items related to dual use.

Finally, a separate law on export control in the country was passed in 2014\(^\text{43}\) and updated in 2017\(^\text{44}\). The law includes information about the approval of the list of controlled goods, technologies and software by the Government. None of the information on the list is publicly available; it requires authorisation in a database of legal acts. It is probably available in the Tajik language in full format.

Turkmenistan has built up legislation directed towards the control of general export rather than the control of the export of strategic goods. In July 1992, the country approved the Decree on the prohibition of the export and import of “arms and ammunition, explosives, nuclear materials, and machinery and equipment for producing armaments”, but without providing any detailed information. In November 1994, a presidential decree provided the list of goods for licensing for export purposes, although this

\(^{40}\) Bertsch and Grillot (1998) and Craft, Grillot, and Anderson (2000).

\(^{41}\) The Law of the Republic of Tajikistan "On state control over the export of arms, military equipment and dual-use", December 13, 1997, N 521. This was superseded by the Law of the Republic of Tajikistan, December 31, 2014, N 1168.


\(^{44}\) The Law of the Republic of Tajikistan on Export Control, February 24, 2017, N 1392.
list did not include any reference to strategic commodities and technologies. Until 1998, it was not included in the adoption of the national control list\textsuperscript{45}.

Furthermore, Article 20 on “Export control”\textsuperscript{46} states that “the list of objects of foreign economic activity subject to export control, as well as the procedure for their export or transit, shall be established by the Cabinet of Ministers of Turkmenistan”. This means that in Turkmenistan, there is no separate the law on export control. Furthermore, there is no information on the national control list in the public domain.

In Uzbekistan\textsuperscript{47}, the legal framework on export control is grounded in decrees from April 1994, July 1995\textsuperscript{48} and March 1996. Only the second decree covered strategic goods; it included:

- Appendix 4 on specific goods whose export and import are carried out under licences issued by the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations of the Republic of Uzbekistan on the basis of orders from the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan (armament and military equipment, particular components for their production, uranium and other radioactive substances, products from these substances, waste from radioactive substances, and instruments and equipment using radioactive substances);

- Appendix 6 on specific goods (works, services) whose export and import is carried out under permits issued by authorised bodies of the Republic of Uzbekistan (export of research results, know-how, inventions);

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{45} Bertsch and Grillot (1998).

\textsuperscript{46} The Law of the Republic of Turkmenistan on Foreign Economic Activity, August 16, 2014, N 103-V.

\textsuperscript{47} Bertsch and Grillot (1998) and Craft, Grillot, and Anderson (2000).

\end{footnotesize}
Appendix 8 on items prohibited for transit through the territory of the Republic of Uzbekistan (items of weapons, ammunition and military equipment, machines and machines intended for the manufacture of weapons, ammunition and aircraft).

In 2004, Uzbekistan enacted the Law on Export control (August 26, 2004, N 658-II), with the latest amendment in 2017. The legal document provides the framework of the export control system, but the Law does not make any reference to the national control list. It is approved by information from the National database of legislation of the Republic of Uzbekistan⁴⁹, particularly by the National Action Plan of the Republic of Uzbekistan on the implementation of international documents in the field of providing chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear safety measures for 2018-2021⁵⁰. The National Plan features item 12 on the “Development of a national list of dual-use goods and technologies” as part of the cooperation with the Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) Program. The period of implementation is 2018-2019. At this time, Uzbekistan has no national control list. According to information in the news, a national list of dual-use goods and technologies that can be used in both civil and military fields will probably be developed in Uzbekistan by the end of 2020.

5. **CONCLUSION**

The national control lists of Central Asian countries all have their features and trends in development. In general, each country of the region should continue to improve its national list, as these lists are essential for national and regional security. The current status of the lists indicates the potential for this improvement.

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⁵⁰ The Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan, November 27, 2018, N 968.
In terms of reference models, Kazakhstan’s national list is based on the EU dual-use control list, while Kyrgyzstan’s list has similarities with the EU list. Tajikistan has no information on the national control list in the public domain, but the list and the information do exist. Turkmenistan has severe deficiencies in terms of its control list, while Uzbekistan still does not have a national list.